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Summary
This book describes a positive model of the implementation of policy decisions.
The model combines the salience of implementation agencies for policy
decisions with the extent to which these agencies are efectively controlled, in
order to predict agency deviations from policy decisions. Special attention is
paid to the fficts of (a lack ofl political consensus on the amount of agency
deviations. Political consensus does not generally enhance compliance--as is
often asserted. This is shown in a theoretical analysis and by an application of
the model on 134 policy performances in three Dutch municipalities.
Theoretical background
Diverging problem perceptions and conflicting policy preferences sometimes
make the implementation of policy decisions a highly political affair. A lack of
consensus among decision makers, and between decision makers and
implementation agencies, is thought to interfere with a proper course of the
implementation process. The relation between politicians and agencies is
sometimes described as the "compliance problem" (Noll & Weingast, l99l).
This concerns the question of the conditions under which implementation
agencies deviate from policy decisions and the conditions under which they do
not. In terms of policy prescription we may ask how the latter conditions can
be successfully realized.
It is often recommended that actors strive for consensus on the propositions
of the policy before implementation takes place. This consensus between
decision makers and implementation agencies is thought to reduce the incentive
of agencies to deviate from the decided outcomes of the formulated policy.
Sometimes such a recommendation is not feasible, for example when policy
perceptions are fundamentally different and the proposed interventions are
highly contested. In those cases, political control of implementation agencies
would presumably reduce the problems of agency compliance, although it is
theoretically unclear how a small number of politicians could actually control
the behavior of a multitude of implementation agencies.
The research in the present book is based on the proposition that
implementation agencies have policy perceptions and preferences of their own.
Their perceptions are based on their past experience and future expectations
regarding policy feasability. Implementation agencies often know the
consequences of their policy interventions better than politicians. This
knowledge may give rise to a policy perception which differs from the policy
perception of politicians. Another important assumption in the present study is
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that implementation agencies strive to realize their own policy positions. This
leads to the following research questions:
I. Under what conditions does a lack of consensus between decision maker"^
and implementotion agencies on the most preferred outcome of policy
decisions lead to policy deviations by implementation agencies?
II. Under what conditions does a lack of consensus among decision makers on
the most preferred outcome of policy decisions lead to policy deviations by
implementation agencies?
Positive model of policy implementation
The research questions are approached through the construction of a simple,
positive model of policy implementation, which incorporates the political
control of agencies. This is in contrast with much of the literature, which
frequently emphasizes the highly complex nature of implementation, and in
which verbal theories are the norm. For the sake of simplicity, in the present
study implementation is regarded as the execution of a policy decision via
individual agencies rather than through complex interorganizational patterns.
The model assumes one-dimensional policy scales and single peaked preference
functions of politicians and agencies. Agencies are assumed to rationaliy
optimize the combination of the reputational consequences of deviating from
the official policy outcome and preferential consequences of moving away from
the most preferred outcome. Agencies implement the policy alternative which
minimizes their net loss.
The behavior of agencies therefore falls between two extremes: full
compliance with the official policy outcome, and full deviation from the policy
in the direction of the agency's most preferred outcome. The compliance
problem arises when there is a conflict of interest between implementation
agencies and politicians. An agency could be expected to rationally deviate
when its own policy preferences are in conflict with the official policy goals. It
is hypothesized that the actual deviating behavior of implementation agencies
varies in accordance with three factors affecting the political control of
agencies: (a) the opportunity space for individual agencies, resulting from
monitoring, sanctioning and their salience for policy decisions; (b) the
reputational sensitivity of agencies, resulting from procedural arrangements; and
(c) the degree of consensus among politicians.
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programs in the domain of social renewal in three Dutch rnunicipalities. This
policy domain was seiected because more discretion of agencies was expected
than in, for example, an infrastructural policy domain. The policy is less
constrained by Dutch national regulations. The policy programs consisted of a
number of local pro.jects. The duration of these projects was relatively short, so
model predictions could be checked in relatively short order.
To gather the relevant data, a first step was to scrutinize all relevant policy
documents. These documents included: (a) the policy proposals of the
administration; (b) the final document containing the statutory principles and
motivation of the public policy; (c) rninutes concerning the discussion of the
policy proposals and the Ílnal document by the city council (and the special
committees on social afÍàirs); (d) internal documents and memos rvithin the
administration; (e) records of discussion meetings with stakeholders and target
groups. From this content analysis resulted a prel iminary inventory of pol icy
decisions, alternative courses of action and actors involved. The second step
$'as to check and detail the gathered information by unstructured interviervs of
a small number of participants who play a central role during decision making
and implementation. This qualitative data collection process provided a birds
eye view of the policy domain: actors, decisions, alternative outcomes and
policy preferences were unveiled, prompting a nunrber of tentative
i nterpretations.
l'he next stage of data-colleclion was to transform the qualitative
interpretat ions into quanti tat ive judgements. For this purpose. trvo "pol icv
domain specialists" were selected (cf. Bueno de Mesquita, Newman &
Rabushka. 1985). Using special ists to obtain the quanti tat ive data has some
advantages over interviewing all participants separately. Policy making often is
a black box, which participants open only with reluctance. The quantitative
questionnaire inhibits forthright judgments of policy preferences and effective
control. The decided outcome was measured by a ciose exarnination of the text
of the policy document. The official1y authorized policy program and its
associated motivation were interpreted as alternative outcome(s) of the relevant
pol icy decision(s). These alternatives were translated into a scale value on each
policy decision: the observed decided outcome. The agency's pol icy
performances were assessed by two means: a careful inspection of official
evaluation reports, and ir.rterviews with the policy domain specialists and
participants. The actions of all irnplen.rentation agencies were listed, described
and interpreted as alternative outome of the policy decisions. This alternative
outcome was translated into a policy scale value. The difference between the
scale values of the observed decided outcome and the policy as implen.rented is
the observed amount of deviation.
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Results
E/fects of monitoring, sanctioning and agency salience
The traditional solution to the compliance problem is contracting,
monitoring and sanctioning. However, monitoring implementation agencies is
extremely difficult to realize due to an asymmetric distribution of information.
Moreover, monitoring is costly because there tends to be a multitude of
agencies and only a limited number of monitoring institutions, such as
legislative committees, the judiciary, the civil service hierarchy and/or courts of
audit. Even when implementation agencies are monitored and can be
sanctioned, it may still be worthwhile for them to deviate from certain policy
decisions. This could occur when agencies have very strong poiicy preferences.
The strong preferences can - for example - be related to what the agency
considers feasible. or to its close relations with certain constituencies. In other
words, even while being closely monitored it can be worthwhile for an agency
to deviate when the policy decision strongly affects the ability to realize its
goals. The extent to which a policy decision is related to the main individual
goals of an actor is Íhe scrlience of that actor with respect o the policy decision.
Implementation theories and models generally draw little attention to salience
rvhen modeling agency behavior. This is an obvious shoficoming because there
is no good reason why salience should play no role in the stage of
implementation. Even when the implementation agency is fully sensitive to
rnonitoring and sanctioning, the agency may be better off by deviating when its
salience is large enough. lhe direct policy/goal-attainment benefits of deviation
compensate for their reputational consequences.
The empirical test provides grounds to suppose that salience in interaction
with effective control is a crucial variable in policy implementation. The results
suggest hat even under conditions of extreme monitoring, agencies wil l be
better off when they deviate than when they comply. if the salience is large
enough. Neither full compliance nor full drift describe agency behavior
correctly.
E//è c ts of administrative procedure s
The reputation sensitivity of implementation agencies is a condition which
aÍïects all agencies. When there are no or only weak procedural arrangements,
the reputation is not so important to agencies. Fixed procedures and strong
involvement of politicians will provide more Íèedback on performance.
Consequently. all agencies wil l deviate less. When a policy program has a low
priority lbr polit icians more deviations occur.
Efíècts of dissent among politicians
It seems reasonable that the political control of agencies could also be
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strongly hampered by dissent among politicians. These effects of a lack of
political consensus can be explained by the tolerance of elected officials for
agency deviations. The elfect of political consensus on agency behavior may
very well be contingent on other characteristics of the implementation agencies.
The model attempts to specify such conditions. The model developed in this
book shows that an implementation agency will deviate ín any ca.re, if its
salience for the policy decision is very large relative to the agency's control
sensitivity. In other words; the deviation of an agency need not be due to a lack
of politicai consensus, but rather to the initial disposition of the agency to
deviate. However, contrary to these theoretical expectations, the empirical data
show no effect of political consensus at all. This result arises in all three
municipalities and for all different types of issues. The absence of an effect of
political consensus is consistent with the few empirical studies available on this
subject.
Forecasting policy outputs
This book has presented a model to explain and predict the deviating behavior
of implementation agencies. The prediction models performed fairly well: about
70 percent of the policy performances were predicted correctly. These results
need to be put in proper perspective. An essential theoretical point is that the
model is a positive model of implementation. The theoretical argument is based
upon rather strong propositions and simplifying assumptions. Reality is much
more complex. fhe applicability of the implementation model therefore is
confined to those issues whicl.r can be properly translated into a set of one-
dimensional policy decisions. Experience with models of collective decision
making give reason for optimism on this point (ci Bueno de Mesquita,
Newman & Rabushka, 1985; Laumann & Kaoke,1987: Stokman & Van den
Bos, 1992). Another limitation of the model is its theoretical confinement to
individual agency execution rather than to implementation in a highly complex
interorganizational context. In-depth empirical research on policy
implementation often shows considerable interdependence arnong agencies (cf.
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989).
The empirical application does not permit a full generalization of results.
One limitation of the empirical application is also its strength: the use of policy
domain specialists. These specialists judge relevant variables independently of
the subjective perceptions of participating actors. In that way, their judgments
are more impartial. Another iimitation of the empirical application is the fact
that the model is only tested on one policy domain in three municipalities.
Additional empirical applications are indispensable to further extend the
arsument in this book.
